Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 117, Heft 522, S. 991-1007
ISSN: 1468-0297
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 117, Heft 522, S. 991-1007
ISSN: 1468-0297
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Working paper
In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Forthcoming
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In: Pacific economic review, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 223-246
ISSN: 1468-0106
In: European journal of political economy, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 1007-1024
ISSN: 1873-5703
The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries. [Copyright 2007 Elsevier B.V.]
In: NIM marketing intelligence review: NIM MIR, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 10-17
ISSN: 2628-166X
Abstract
Hunting for "stars", the icons of the reputation economy, is a prerequisite for survival in e-commerce in general and on sharing platforms in particular. The key to understanding the rise of reputation is trust, and the ability of a platform to provide this trust has become crucial in the past decade. Social media managers are now key players in marketing departments. One of their most important jobs is the careful curation of digital reputations. Marketers need to engage in diverse forms of reputation management and master several challenges in designing the right systems and utilizing reputation information in optimal ways. Engendering trust is more complex than gaining star ratings or positive reviews on owned or third-party platforms. How platforms are designed – in terms of how people can make bookings or orders and how users rate each other – is the key issue. It needs to be managed in a sophisticated way, especially in an era when topics such as racial and ethnic justice are key societal concerns.
This paper experimentally investigates trust and trustworthiness in a repeated and sequential three-player trust game with probabilistic returns and information asymmetry. It adds to the existing literature by combining experimental features from recent work in the trust game. The authors use random variations in the multiplier value, a third player without an initial endowment, undisclosed termination rules, and variations in information availability related to transactions. The framework is novel in that the game continues even if the first player transfers no amount to the second player. Using participants from India, the results are broadly consistent with past evidence on the trust game. All players are more trusting when information of their transfers and earnings are made available to other players. The third player (termed the "trust broker") transfers a larger amount when information on transfers is disclosed to other players. The authors find that information availability leads to a significant increase in the trust broker's reciprocity, as defined by the amount that is returned to Player 2. Social desirability, cultural contexts, and learning effects are discussed in terms of scope for future research.
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 1007-1024
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 190, Heft 5, S. 909-922
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Gómez‐Miñambres, J., Schniter, E., & Shields, T. W. (2021). Investment Choice Architecture In Trust Games: When "All‐In" Is Not Enough. Economic Inquiry, 59(1), 300-314.
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In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 11, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
This paper presents an experiment measuring how lab-induced group identity affects trust and trustworthiness in a repeated trust game with random matching. Identity had positive in-group and negative out-group effects on trust. However, the in-group effect was small and statistically insignificant, while the out-group effect was large. Trustworthiness was determined mainly by reciprocity effects.
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 27-43
ISSN: 1460-3667
The extent of human cooperation depends on the institutional arenas wherein people interact. Scholars from the Ostrom school have been particularly interested in how behavior in common property institutions differs from private property. Using a model of reciprocal motivations, I hypothesize that common property institutions elicit less cooperation than private property institutions in post-Communist Bulgaria. To investigate this hypothesis, this article reports on a series of experiments that examine the effects of common and private property in the trust game. The results indicate that common property institutions in Bulgaria elicit less cooperation than private property.
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Working paper
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00728 ; Trustful and trustworthy behaviors have important externalities for the society. But what exactly drives people to behave in a trustful and trustworthy manner? Building on research suggesting that individuals' social preferences might be a common factor informing both behaviors, we study the impact of a set of different motives on individuals' choices in a dual-role Trust Game (TG). We employ data from a large-scale representative experiment (N = 774), where all subjects played both roles of a binary TG with real monetary incentives. Subjects' social motives were inferred using their decisions in a Dictator Game and a dual-role Ultimatum Game. Next to self-interest and strategic motives we consider preferences for altruism, spitefulness, egalitarianism, and efficiency. We demonstrate that there exists considerable heterogeneity in motives in the TG. Most importantly, among individuals who choose to trust as trustors, social motives can differ dramatically as there is a non-negligible proportion of them who seem to act out of (strategic) self-interest whereas others are driven more by efficiency considerations. Subjects' elicited trustworthiness, however, can be used to infer such motivations: while the former are not trustworthy as trustees, the latter are. We discuss that research on trust can benefit from adding the second player's choice in TG designs. ; Financial support comes from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2010-17049), the Government of Andalusia Project for Excellence in Research (P07.SEJ.02547) and the Fundacion Ramón Areces R+D 2011. The publication of this article was funded by the Open Access Fund of the Leibniz Association.
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In: European Accounting Review, 22.3 (2013): 513-532
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